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Abstract
In this paper, a code-based public-key cryptosystem based on interleaved Goppa codes is presented. The scheme
is based on encrypting several ciphertexts with the same Goppa code and adding a burst error to them. Possible
attacks are outlined and the key size of several choices of parameters is compared to those of known schemes for
the same security level. For example, for security level 128 bits, we obtain a key size of 696 Kbits whereas the
classical McEliece scheme based on Goppa codes using list decoding requires a key size of 1935 Kbits.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The security of a cryptographic scheme is achieved due to the intractability of certain problems through modern
computers. Currently, several companies are trying to build a quantum computer with computational capabilities
and power beyond classical computing limits. In 1994, Shor introduced an algorithm [25] that enables factorization
of large integers and finding discrete logarithms on capable quantum computers efficiently. Shor’s algorithm would
therefore break currently used public-key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA [21] and also systems based on
elliptic curve cryptography. As a result, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently initiated
a standardization process of post-quantum secure cryptosystems, including code-based cryptosystems.
The McEliece code-based cryptosystem [13] is based on the hardness of decoding a random code. In this scheme,
Alice chooses a linear code, masks its generator matrix by multiplying it with two special random matrices and keeps
all three as a private key. Her public key is the product of these matrices, which can be used for encryption. However,
decryption can only be done if the decomposition of the public key into the three matrices is known. The original
system based on Goppa codes is still unbroken and has been recommended by the PQCrypto project for long-term
protection against attacks by a quantum computer [1]. However, the key sizes are rather large compared to classical
public-key cryptosystems which has motivated a large amount of research on different code classes for the McEliece
system. Many variants based on different code classes, e.g., Reed–Solomon codes were broken [26]. Unbroken
variants with smaller key sizes than when using Goppa codes include variants of the McEliece cryptosystem (or its
dual variant, the Niederreiter scheme [16]) based on MDPC codes [15]; and some systems based on rank-metric
codes: e.g., [11] (originally called the Gabidulin–Paramanov–Tretjakov (GPT) system [9]), the repair of [8] which
was shown in [27], low-rank-parity-check codes [10]; and systems based on twisted codes [4], [19].
The original proposal of the McEliece system [13] using Goppa codes is considered to be secure against structural
attacks. Encryption and decryption are very efficient due to efficient encoding/decoding methods of Goppa codes.
However, in practice the system has the severe drawback of very large key sizes (e.g., several hundred KByte for
128 bits security level). The main goal of this paper is therefore to reduce the key size of the Goppa code-based
McEliece system while not changing the structure of the code. The latter is important as Goppa codes are the only
class of codes that has remained resilient against structural attacks on the McEliece cryptosystem for long time.
Our significant key size reduction is achieved by using so-called interleaved codes, cf. [5]–[7], [23], i.e., using
several parallel codewords of the same code, in combination with burst errors.
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2This paper is structured as follows. Section II gives preliminaries on Goppa codes and the McEliece system
and introduces notation. In Section III, the new system based on interleaved codes is defined and in Section IV,
possible attacks are shown. This analysis includes an attack that breaks the system if the interleaving order is too
large. The key sizes and security levels of our system are compared to known systems in Section V. Section VI
concludes the paper and gives an outlook.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Goppa Codes and Reed–Solomon Codes
Let p be a prime power and let q = pm for some m > 1. Let Fp and Fq denote the finite fields of order p and q,
respectively, and let Fq[x] denote the polynomial ring over Fq.
We index vectors and matrices starting from one, e.g., a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ Fnq denotes a vector of length n
with coefficients in Fq. By the triple [n, k, d]p, we denote a p-ary code of length n, dimension k, and minimum
Hamming distance d.
Let L = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ Fnq consist of n non-zero distinct elements (code locators) of Fq with n ≤ q. Let
g(x) ∈ Fq[x] be an irreducible monic polynomial of degree r such that g(αi) 6= 0,∀i = 1, . . . , n (sometimes called
the Goppa polynomial). For any word e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) ∈ Fnp , the corresponding Goppa syndrome polynomial
se(x) ∈ Fq[x] is defined by
se(x) =
n∑
i=1
ei
x− αi mod g(x).
Definition 1 (Goppa Code) The (irreducible) Goppa code Γ(L, g) with support L is the kernel of the syndrome
function over Fp, i.e., the set:
Γ(L, g) , {e ∈ Fnp : se(x) = 0 mod g(x)} . (1)
The Goppa code Γ(L, g) is an [n, k ≥ n−mr, d ≥ r+ 1]p code (cf. [12, Ch. 12]). For binary Goppa codes, it can
be shown that their minimum distance is at least 2r + 1.
Binary Goppa codes can be decoded up to r errors uniquely by using Patterson’s algorithm [17]. For non-binary
Goppa codes, only b r2c errors can be guaranteed to be decoded uniquely, but the algorithm from [3] can decode
up to b2rp c errors with high probability which improves upon Patterson’s algorithm only for p = 3.
Note that the results of this paper extend straight-forward to square-free Goppa codes (i.e., g(x) has no multiple
roots), but for simplicity, we restrict the description to irreducible Goppa codes.
The Goppa code Γ(L, g) is a p-ary subfield subcode of a generalized Reed–Solomon (RS) RS(n, kRS = n− r)
code over Fq of length n, dimension kRS and minimum distance r + 1 which is defined by:
RS(n, kRS) = {(ν1f(α1), ν2f(α2), . . . , νnf(αn)) : f(x) ∈ Fq[x], deg f(x) < kRS}, (2)
where α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fq are distinct elements and νi = 1g(αi) , for all i = 1, . . . , n, cf. [22, p. 182].
B. Interleaved Goppa and Reed–Solomon Codes
In this paper, code interleaving refers to using s parallel codewords of the same code. An interleaved Goppa
code is therefore defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Interleaved Goppa Code) Let Γ(L, g) denote an [n, k ≥ n − mr, d ≥ r + 1]p Goppa code. An
s-interleaved Goppa code is denoted by IΓ(L, g, s) and defined by
IΓ(L, g, s) =


c(1)
c(2)
...
c(s)

 ,
where c(i) ∈ Γ(L, g), ∀i = 1, . . . , s.
3Further, an interleaved (generalized) Reed–Solomon (IRS) code can be defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Interleaved Reed–Solomon Code) For n distinct elements α1, α2, . . . , αn ∈ Fq and n non-zero
elements ν1, ν2, . . . , νn ∈ Fq, an Interleaved Reed–Solomon code IRS(n, kRS, s) of interleaving order s is given
by
IRS(n, kRS, s) =


(ν1f
(1)(α1), ν2f
(1)(α2), . . . , νnf
(1)(αn))
(ν1f
(2)(α1), ν2f
(2)(α2), . . . , νnf
(2)(αn))
...
(ν1f
(s)(α1), ν2f
(s)(α2), . . . , νnf
(s)(αn))

 ,
where f (i)(x) ∈ Fq[x],deg f (i)(x) < kRS, ∀i = 1, . . . , s.
Notice that in general, the definition of IRS codes can be more general, i.e., having s parallel codewords from s RS
codes with different dimensions and different column multipliers νi. However, in this paper we focus on so-called
homogeneous IRS codes, i.e., the s rows are codewords from the same RS code.
Interleaved codes are frequently considered in connection with burst errors, i.e., the s elementary codewords of
the s-interleaved code are affected by s elementary error words e(1), e(2), . . . , e(s) of weight wt(e(i)) = ti ≤ t
where the union of the s sets of error positions E = E(1) ∪ E(2) ∪ · · · ∪ E(s) ⊆ {1, . . . , n} has cardinality |E| = t.
Equivalently, E denotes the t non-zero columns of E where
E ,

e(1)
e(2)
...
e(s)
 . (3)
By solving a joint key equation (cf. [23]), for an IRS(n, kRS, s) code,
tIRS ,
⌊
s
s+ 1
(n− kRS)
⌋
burst errors (i.e., erroneous columns of E) can be corrected uniquely with high probability, cf. [5]–[7], [23].
Compared to unique decoding, this can increase the decoding radius by a factor of almost two. Note that there
are decoders that achieve an even higher decoding radius for small s (and mostly for low-rate IRS codes), e.g.,
[20], [28], but in this paper, we focus on decoding up to tIRS errors. As we will see in Section III-B, if we choose
s ≥ tIRS, we can guarantee decryption/decoding, but such a system is not secure (Section IV). In particular, for
s = n− kRS − 1, we obtain the maximum possible decoding radius of all IRS decoders (also [20], [28]), which is
tIRS = s = n− kRS − 1.
If we interleave the RS(n, n− r) code which is a supercode (see (2)) of a given Γ(L, g) code with parameters
[n, k ≥ n−mr, d ≥ r + 1]p, then
tIRS =
⌊
sr
s+ 1
⌋
, (4)
and for s = r−1, we obtain tIRS = s = r−1. Since the IΓ(L, g, s) code is a subfield subcode of the IRS(n, n−r, s)
code, also the s-interleaved Goppa code can be decoded up to tIRS = s = r − 1 errors.
The concept of interleaving is also illustrated in Fig. 1.
4Figure 1. Concept of interleaving: s codewords of an [n, k, d]p code are encoded in parallel (left). They can equivalently be seen as one
word of length sn (right side).
C. The McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece cryptosystem [13] and its dual variant, the Niederreiter cryptosystem [16], provide general princi-
ples for code-based cryptography based on linear codes. The basic idea of the McEliece cryptosystem is illustrated
in Fig. 2. The private key consists of three matrices S, G, P where G is the generator matrix of a t-error correcting
code. The private key is known only to the intended receiver (“Alice”). The public key is the product Gpub = S·G·P
and t. Encryption (by “Bob”) is done by calculating from a plaintext m the ciphertext c = m ·Gpub + e, where e
is a random vector of weight t. The receiver (“Alice”) can recover the plaintext because she knows the private key.
An eavesdropper (“Eve”) should not be able to recover the matrix G and thus has to decode an unknown code.
Bob
Gpub, t
Alice
S, G, P, t
Eve
Gpub, t
ciphertext:
c = m ·Gpub + e
Figure 2. Principle of the McEliece cryptosystem.
III. THE NEW PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON INTERLEAVED GOPPA CODES
A. The System
Our proposed cryptosystem is an instantiation of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem using an s-interleaved
non-binary Goppa code IΓ(L, g, s) with parameters [n, k ≥ n−mr, d ≥ r + 1]p and p > 2.
This means that we encode s messages of length k into s Goppa codewords of length n and add a burst error
of weight tIRS (see (4)) to these interleaved codewords. Of course, we can see this as encrypting one message of
length sk into one ciphertext of length sn. The decoding process that is needed for the decryption is then done in
the IRS supercode IRS(n, n− r, s) which can correct a burst error of weight tIRS.
f
First, the key generation process is shown in the following. It is basically as for the McEliece cryptosystem based
on Goppa codes, with the difference that an efficient decoder up to tIRS errors of the interleaved Goppa code is
now part of the private key.
5Key Generation:
• Choose parameters:
– Prime power q = pm with p > 2;
– Integers m,n such that n ≤ q;
– Locators L = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ Fnq (n distinct elements of Fq);
– Irreducible monic polynomial g(x) ∈ Fq[x] of degree r such that g(αi) 6= 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n;
– Integer s and calculate tIRS = b srs+1c;
• Generate the following matrices:
– S ∈ Fk×kp : random non-singular matrix, called scrambler matrix;
– G ∈ Fk×np : generator matrix of an [n, k ≥ n−mr, d ≥ r + 1]p Γ(L, g) code;
– P ∈ Fn×np : random permutation matrix.
• Compute Gpub = SGP ∈ Fk×np .
• Define the key pair:
– Public key: (Gpub, tIRS, s);
– Private key: (S,P,D) where D is an efficient decoding algorithm for the s-interleaved Goppa code up to
tIRS errors.
Notice that we use p > 2 since for p = 2, the IRS supercode decoder cannot decode more errors than the standard
Patterson decoder [17] which can correct up to r errors uniquely for binary Goppa codes.
The encryption process works similar as in the McEliece cryptosystem, with the difference that we are now
creating s codewords of a Goppa code which are corrupted by a burst error of weight tIRS.
Encryption:
• Input: s plaintexts m(i) ∈ Fkp , i = 1, . . . , s;
• Generate full-rank random matrix EtIRS ∈ Fs×tIRSp without zero elements;
• Generate tIRS random positions E ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and denote by e(i) ∈ Fnp the vector that contains the entries
of the i-th row of EtIRS on the tIRS positions of E (ordered as in EtIRS), for all i = 1, . . . , s;
• Encryption: c(i) = m(i)Gpub + e(i) ∈ Fnp , for all i = 1, . . . , s;
• Output: s ciphertexts c(i) ∈ Fnp , i = 1, . . . , s.
The reason to choose only non-zero elements for E is that having rows of smaller weight in E would facilitate an
information set decoding attack on these rows and therefore decrease the overall security level (see also Section IV).
Further, EtIRS is chosen to be a full-rank matrix as this decreases the failure probability of decoding/decryption
significantly.
Decryption:
• Input: s ciphertexts c(i) ∈ Fnp , i = 1, . . . , s;
• Inverse Permutation: c(i)P−1 = m(i)SG+ e(i)P−1, for all i = 1, . . . , s;
• Decoding: (m(1)S, . . . ,m(s)S) = D(c(1)P−1, . . . , c(s)P−1);
• m(i) = m(i)SS−1, for all i = 1, . . . , s;
• Output: s plaintexts m(i) ∈ Fkp , for all i = 1, . . . , s.
B. Decryption Guarantee
The system from the previous section is shown as a general system, using any integer s as interleaving order. In
the following, we will show that if we choose s = r − 1 (which implies tIRS = r − 1), we can guarantee correct
decryption (i.e., no decryption failures occur). However, in Section IV, we show that for s ≥ tIRS, our system can
be broken by the decoding algorithm from [14]. Since we believe that failure-free decoding/decryption is interesting
for the reader anyway, we show the details in the following.
6As decoder in the decryption process, we can use any decoder of [5]–[7], [23] which work for any s. In general,
these decoders decode only with high probability. When choosing s ≥ tIRS, then, due to [14, Thm. 2], there is
a unique decoding result and any interleaved decoder (e.g., the one from [23]) guarantees to return the unique
decoding result. In particular, if we want to have this guarantee and therefore no decryption failures, we can choose
s = tIRS = r − 1.
Theorem 1 (Decoding/Decryption Guarantee) Consider an s-interleaved non-binary Goppa code IΓ(L, g, s)
where each row is from a Γ(L, g) code with parameters [n, k ≥ n−mr, d ≥ r+1]p and p > 2. Let s = tIRS = r−1.
For any s× tIRS full-rank error matrix E, the syndrome-based interleaved decoder from [23] can always correct
up to tIRS = r − 1 errors uniquely.
Proof: The proof from [14, Thm. 2] can be applied to our setting as follows. We prove that the syndrome
matrix used in the decoding process of [23] has full rank tIRS if s = tIRS.
Consider the following matrix:
S′ = HRS ·ET ,
where E is the s × n matrix from (3) which is determined by the s × tIRS full-rank matrix EtIRS and E in the
encryption process; and HRS is a parity check matrix of the RS(n, n − r) supercode from (2). This can be
rewritten by considering only the tIRS non-zero columns of E by
S′ = HRStIRS ·ETtIRS ,
where EtIRS contains the non-zero columns of E and HRStIRS is the corresponding (n−kRS)× tIRS submatrix of HRS.
From [23, Eq. (17)], it follows that the IRS decoder always returns a unique decoding result (i.e., it does not fail)
if S′ has rank tIRS. This is true in our case since EtIRS has full-rank tIRS and HRStIRS as well since it is a submatrix
of a parity-check matrix. Thus, the decoder from [23] will always correct up to tIRS = s errors.
Notice that in the decryption process of our cryptosystem, the decoder is applied to EP−1 which is a full rank
matrix as both, E and P are full rank, and therefore Theorem 1 holds for EP−1 as well.
IV. POSSIBLE ATTACKS
A. Metzner-Kapturowski Decoding Attack
If s ≥ tIRS and EtIRS has full rank, then the algorithm from [14] decodes efficiently any interleaved code, just
by applying Gaussian elimination on the product of the parity-check matrix and the corrupted codeword.
This principle can therefore be applied as follows to break our system if s ≥ tIRS and if EtIRS is a full-rank
matrix:
• Calculate Hpub from Gpub such that Hpub has full rank and Gpub ·HTpub = 0 (i.e., Hpub is a parity-check
matrix of the public code generated by Gpub);
• Consider the s ciphertexts c(i) ∈ Fnp , i = 1, . . . , s. They are codewords of the public code with generator
matrix Gpub and parity-check matrix Hpub, corrupted by a full-rank burst error.
• Decode all c(i) with Hpub according to the algorithm from [14] which then provides the s secret messages in
cubic time.
This general decoding principle therefore provides an attack to our system if s ≥ tIRS and if rk(EtIRS) = tIRS.
From a high-level point of view, decoding a “random” interleaved code is an easy problem for larger interleaving
orders and if the burst errors has full rank.
Thus, for our parameter calculation in Section V, we have to choose s < tIRS. Also, since it might be possible
to search the whole solution space of the decoder from [14] if s < tIRS, we should choose s “not too close” to
tIRS. Straight-forward, searching the solution space would provide an attack of complexity O(n3pm(tIRS−s)) which
does not decrease the security level of the parameters that we suggest in Section V, but the investigation if this
can be done more efficiently is left for future work.
7B. Information Set Decoding and Ball Collision Attack
In the classical information set decoding (ISD) attack, the attacker tries to guess an error-free information set.
The work factor of ISD clearly increases with the number of errors added in the encryption process. Similar as it
can be applied to the classical McEliece system based on Goppa codes, it can be applied to our interleaved system.
However, as we are adding a burst error (i.e., s error vectors with non-zero elements at the same set of positions
for each row) to the interleaved code, knowing an error-free information set of one ciphertext directly gives us
error-free information sets of the other s − 1 ciphertexts. Thus, we assume that the work factor (i.e., the average
complexity) of ISD for our s-interleaved system is the same as for the classical McEliece system with one ciphertext
of length n where tIRS arbitrary errors were added.
For codes with p ≥ 3, the work factor of the classical ISD attacks and its variants is larger than for p = 2 as
every operation needs to be carried out over Fp. Therefore, to estimate the security level in bits (which is defined
as the log2 of the work factor), the work factor for p-ary ISD is calculated by log2(p) times the work factor for
binary ISD for the same code parameters. This is just a lower bound and usually, the work factors for p-ary ISD
can be much larger than for the binary case, see [18].
As best-known variant of ISD, we use the ball collision attack to calculate the work factors and security levels.
The work factor of the ball collision attack for binary Goppa codes with parameters [n, k, d]2 (when an error of
weight t is added) is:
WBC(n, k, t) = min
{
1
2
(
n
t
)(
n− k
t− `
)−1(k
`
)− 1
2
: 0 ≤ ` ≤ min{t, k}
}
. (5)
C. Decoding-One-Out-of-Many Attack
The decoding-one-out-of-many attack [24] reduces the work factor W of any attack if the attackers has access
to s ciphertexts and is interested in decoding only one of the messages. However, this attack provides a gain for
the attacker on the work factor only if W ≤ s3/2. If this condition holds, e.g., the ISD work factor WISD would
be reduced to W 2/3ISD . However, as we will see in the next section, this attack is not relevant for the parameters that
we choose.
V. COMPARISON TO OTHER SYSTEMS AND CHOICE OF PARAMETERS
To compare the security levels and key sizes of our system to known systems, we first compare the following
three variants of Goppa codes used in the McEliece system:
A) s-Interleaved: This refers to our suggested system, see Section III-A, where s messages of length k are
encrypted into s ciphertexts of length n by a Γ(L, g) Goppa code with parameters [n, k, d ≥ r + 1]p and a
burst error of weight tIRS = b srs+1c is added.
Table I and Table II use interleaving orders with s < tIRS and therefore the system has a small decryption
failure probability.
As explained in Section IV, the most efficient attack is the ball collision attack, which needs to be applied only
to one ciphertext of length n. Thus, for a p-ary interleaved Goppa code, it has work factor (i.e., complexity)
at least
log2(p)WBC(n, k, tIRS).
B) s-Independent: In this setting, also s messages of length k are encrypted into s ciphertexts of length n
by an [n, k, d ≥ r + 1]p Goppa code. However, the errors are added on each ciphertext independently. The
maximum number of errors that can be added to be able to decode each ciphertext independently uniquely
is tu = b2rp c, see [3]. To obtain guaranteed decoding in this scheme (i.e., failure probability zero), tu = b r2c
could be used. Notice that this decoding radius of [3] is only achieved with a certain failure probability and
only improves upon tu = b r2c for p = 3.
The work factor of the ball collision attack for the s ciphertexts is therefore s times the work factor for one
ciphertext with tu errors, i.e.,
s log2(p)WBC(n, k, tu).
8This scheme can basically be seen as the classical McEliece cryptosystem (with a slightly better decoder if
tu = b2rp c is used).
C) Long Code: Here, the message is encrypted to a single ciphertext of length sn by using an [n∗ = sn, k∗, d∗ ≥
r∗ + 1]p Goppa code which is constructed from a polynomial g∗(x) of degree r∗. Decryption is done by
using the unique decoder from [3] up to t∗u = b2r
∗
p c errors. Also here, decryption is only done with high
probability. The parameters k∗ and d∗ are chosen in our comparison either such that the key size is the same
as in the s-interleaved case or such that the security level is the same.
The best known attack is the ball collision attack applied to the single ciphertext of length n∗ = sn, i.e., it
has work factor
log2(p)WBC(sn, k
∗, t∗u).
Table I shows a comparison between the three systems A, B, C based on Goppa codes with (almost) equal key size
where the key size in bits is K = dlog2(p)(n−k)ke for Methods A and B, respectively K∗ = dlog2(p)(sn−k∗)k∗e
for Method C. The security level in bits is the log2 of the previously mentioned work factors based on the ball
collision attack. The dimension in the table is lower bounded by k ≥ n− rm.
For Method C, there are two possibilities to choose k∗ as K = K∗ results in a quadratic equation in k∗, both
resulting in the same security level but one of high code rate and one of low code rate. For Method A, in Table I
the general definition of the cryptosystem with small values for s is used and therefore, the IRS decoder has a small
failure probability (cf. [23]). However, as both, Method B and C are based on the decoding algorithm from [3],
they also have a decryption failure probability (which, according to our simulations, seems to be much larger than
the one for Method A based on [23]).
We can see that for s = 3, 7, our proposed s-interleaved cryptosystem (Method A) provides the largest security
level. The case s = 2 and p = 3 is quite special as the decoding radius t coincides for methods A and B (and
therefore adding burst errors actually does not make sense). However, in the interleaved case an attacker needs to
decode only one out of the two ciphertexts and therefore the security level is lower than for Method B.
In general, Method A reaches a significantly larger security level for the same key size and therefore in the next
table, only Method A is compared to the classical McEliece system using list decoding.
Table I
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT METHODS FOR CODES WITH (ALMOST) EQUAL KEY SIZE:
METHOD A (s-INTERLEAVED): s× [n, k, d]p GOPPA CODE WITH BURST ERROR OF WEIGHT t = tIRS = b srs+1c ERRORS.
METHOD B (s-INDEPENDENT): s CODEWORDS OF AN [n, k, d]p GOPPA CODE WITH s INDEPENDENT ERRORS OF WEIGHT t = b 2rp c.
METHOD C (LONG CODE): A SINGLE CODEWORD OF AN [n∗ = sn, k∗, d∗]p GOPPA CODE WITH AN ERROR OF WEIGHT t = b 2r∗p c.
Method s p r or r∗ t m k or k∗ ≥ n or n∗ Security level [bits] Code rate ≥ Key size [bits]
A (Interleaved) 2 3 54 36 7 1809 2187 84 0.82 1083801
B 2 3 54 36 7 1809 2187 86 0.82 1083801
C 2 3 21 14 8 4211 4374 58 0.96 1087908
C 2 3 527 351 8 163 4374 58 0.03 1087908
A (Interleaved) 3 3 54 40 7 1809 2187 93 0.82 1083801
B 3 3 54 36 7 1809 2187 86 0.82 1083801
C 3 3 14 9 8 6455 6561 45 0.98 1084479
C 3 3 807 538 9 106 6561 45 0.01 1084479
A (Interleaved) 7 3 54 47 10 58509 59049 256 0.99 50076669
B 7 3 54 36 10 58509 59049 200 0.99 50551776
C 7 3 7 7 12 413267 59049 37 0.99 50435856
C 7 3 34439 34439 12 76 59049 6 0.001 50435856
9In Table II, we compare our scheme with using a binary Goppa code and list decoding as presented in [2] which
is the most efficient instantiation of the McEliece system based on standard (i.e., square-free or irreducible) Goppa
codes. Compared to the McEliece system based on unique decoding, list decoding as in [2] reduces the key size
by at most 5% for the same security level. As we have seen in Table I, our s-interleaved scheme reduces the key
size significantly compared to the s-independent (Method B) scheme and the long code (Method C). Those two
methods and unique decoding of Goppa codes (i.e., the “classical” McEliece scheme) are therefore not listed in
Table II.
Note that our decryption algorithm (Method A) has a small failure probability. As previously mentioned, Meth-
ods B and C have a non-negligible failure probability as well since they are based on the decoding algorithm
from [3]. According to our simulations, the failure probability of interleaved decoding seems to be much smaller
than the one from [3]. The list decoding method from [2] might return a list of possible codewords which can be
seen similar to a failure probability. Note that their list might be reducible to one codeword by using a CCA2-secure
variant, see [2], but this requires additional effort (rate reduction) and is not considered here.
The decoding-one-out-of-many attack mentioned in Section IV-C does not play a role in both tables as the work
factor for all methods is always larger than s3/2.
Note that there are other schemes, e.g., quasi-cyclic moderate-density-parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes as in [15],
where our key size is larger for the same security level. However, as QC-MDPC codes have not resisted structural
attacks for 40 years as Goppa codes, we believe it is fair to mainly compare our results to [2].
Our Method A reduces the key size significantly compared to using list decoding in the classical McEliece
system. In particular, for security level 128 bit, the bottom-most instantiation is remarkable as the code rate and
security level are the same as in [2], the total ciphertext length sn = 2662 is smaller than the one of [2] (3262),
and the key size is reduced by 42%. Similary, for security level 256 bit, the bottom-most row shows almost the
same code rate, same security level, sn = 8788 is only slightly larger than n = 7008, but the key size is reduced
by 59%. Even larger reductions of the key size are possible when we allow sn of Method A to be larger than n
of [2], e.g., for security level 128 bit, the third instantiation of our method reduces the key size compared to [2]
by 64%.
Table II
COMPARISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT SCHEMES LEADING TO (ALMOST) EQUAL SECURITY LEVEL:
METHOD A (s-INTERLEAVED): s× [n, k, d]p GOPPA CODE WITH BURST ERROR OF WEIGHT t = tIRS = b srs+1c ERRORS.
LIST DECODING [2]: ONE CODEWORD OF AN [n, k, d ≥ 2r + 1]2 BINARY GOPPA CODE WHERE t IS THE BINARY JOHNSON RADIUS:
t = n
2
(1−
√
1− 4r+2
n
).
Method s p r t m k ≥ n− rm Length n Security level [bits] Code rate ≥ Key size [bits]
List decoding 1 2 40 41 11 1436 1876 80 0.77 631 840
A (Interleaved) 21 4 42 40 5 814 1024 80 0.79 341 880
A (Interleaved) 6 4 54 46 5 754 1024 80 0.74 407 160
List decoding 1 2 65 66 12 2482 3262 128 0.76 1935 960
A (Interleaved) 31 3 64 62 7 1739 2187 128 0.76 1234 799
A (Interleaved) 7 3 84 73 7 1599 2187 128 0.73 1490 200
A (Interleaved) 20 11 58 55 3 1157 1331 129 0.87 696 445
A (Interleaved) 2 11 107 71 3 1010 1331 127 0.76 1121 582
List decoding 1 2 130 133 13 5318 7008 257 0.76 8987 420
A (Interleaved) 10 5 167 151 5 2290 3125 256 0.73 4439 874
A (Interleaved) 6 5 206 176 5 2059 3125 256 0.67 5010 372
A (Interleaved) 65 13 131 129 3 1804 2197 257 0.82 2623 508
A (Interleaved) 4 13 207 165 3 1576 2197 257 0.72 3621 605
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VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we have presented a public-key code-based cryptosystem based on interleaved Goppa codes.
Compared to the classical McEliece system using list decoding, our scheme can reduce the key size by over 50%
for the same security level while keeping the code structure which has remained resilient against structural attacks
for many years.
The following tasks are left for future work:
• Explicit analysis of the failure probability of our approach. This includes the derivation of an explicit upper
bound as in [23] for decoding interleaved subfield subcodes (e.g., Goppa codes) as well the simulation of the
failure probability for the parameters suggested in Tables I and II;
• Can the decoding algorithm from [14] be used to obtain an efficient attack by searching the solution space?
Straight-forward, the complexity is too large to reduce the security level (see Section IV-A);
• Interleaved decoding of Goppa codes not only to the interleaved decoding radius of the IRS code, but to a
larger radius.
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